The Long Struggle

Writing in Policy Review, Bruce Berkowitz outlines a strategy for a long struggle. An excerpt:

Soviet citizens hated their government so much that the regime had to wall them in to keep them from fleeing. Warsaw Pact “allies” viewed the Soviet Union as an occupying power. Marxist-Leninist ideology lost any sway it ever enjoyed among the masses by the 1970s. The Kremlin leadership consisted of old, pampered, faceless apparatchiks whom Soviet citizens feared, loathed, and laughed at. Meanwhile, the most highly regarded Russian intellectuals, like Alexandr Solzhenitsyn and Andrei Sakharov, were considered enemies of the state.

Compare that to al Qaeda today. Members of al Qaeda are willing to crash aircraft into buildings and explode backpack bombs in subways. One can say these terrorists and their sympathizers are evil, but one cannot say that they are not highly committed. Militant Islamic fundamentalism is, where it exists, a grassroots movement springing from thousands of mosques and madrasas. Meanwhile, Osama bin Laden is a revered figure in much of the Muslim world. Islamicist websites advocating violent jihad enjoy huge audiences on the Internet.

These factors affect every aspect of U.S. strategy. When an adversary has this kind of broad-based support and commitment, our military planners cannot count on a demoralized opponent. Diplomats have a tougher challenge in the war of ideas. Intelligence officers cannot count on defectors or émigrés eager to cooperate with a regime they admire.