Learning from Lee, Jackson, and Hooker

Writing in Small Wars Journal, David Tyler draws lessons from the Battle of Chancellorsville. An excerpt:

The preconceived notion that the enemy would react in accordance with the plan undercut the AOTP’s ability to take aggressive action outside the boundaries of the plan. This was the milieu of false confidence that was in the minds of Union leaders when Jackson struck Howard’s Corps from the West. While the physical damage that Jackson caused was significant, the psychological damage delivered was devastating.  The Confederates ultimately won at Chancellorsville and drove Hooker back toward the Rappahannock.  They then turned to face Sedgwick’s eastern command at Salem Church on May 3-4, 1863.  Sedgwick fended off Confederate attacks from three directions, but finding himself almost encircled, he also retired to the river.  At that point, Hooker ended the Chancellorsville campaign and crossed the Rappahannock, leaving the field in the possession of an army half the size of his own.

[Execupundit note: AOTP = Army of the Potomac]